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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Thomas N. Townsend appeals from his conviction for misdemeanor DUI.
Specifically, he challenges the denial of his motion to suppress.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Townsend with one count of DUI, second offense, and
one count of failure to purchase a driver’s license, both misdemeanors. (R., pp.
6-7, 65-66.) Townsend moved to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content
(“BAC”) obtained as a result of a blood draw. (R., pp. 17-21.) The magistrate
found that Detective Weires pulled Townsend over after he drove “the wrong way
into the oncoming east bound lanes of State Street.” (R., p. 50.) A “strong odor
of alcohol” emanated from the cab of Townsend’s truck, “Townsend had glassy,
red eyes, … his speech was thick-tongued and slurred,” he admitted he had just
left a bar, and also admitted consuming seven beers. (R., p. 51.) Townsend
failed all three field sobriety tests and Detective Weires arrested him for DUI.
(R., p. 51.)
Detective Weires performed a breath test on Townsend, after waiting 15
minutes to observe him, but Townsend stopped blowing on his first attempt
(producing an insufficient sample) and “simply failed to exhale any air on his
second attempt.” (R., pp. 51-52.)
Townsend stated that he was not going to comply with the test and
that Weires would have to take his blood. Townsend was
transported to the Ada County Jail to submit a blood sample. After
arriving at the Ada County Jail, an Ada County paramedic drew
blood samples from Townsend. Weires testified that Townsend was
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polite and compliant and that he did not physically resist the blood
draw.
(R., p. 52.)
The magistrate denied the motion to suppress on two bases. First, it
found the blood draw appropriate under implied consent.

(R., pp. 54-56.)

Second, it found the warrantless blood draw proper under exigent circumstances.
(R., pp. 56-60.)
Townsend entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to
challenge the denial of suppression on appeal. (R., pp. 70-71.) He appealed
from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 64, 75-77.) The district court affirmed the
magistrate’s exigent circumstances holding without reaching the implied consent
holding. (R., pp. 143-151.) Townsend again appealed. (R., pp. 153-55.)
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ISSUE
Townsend states the issue on appeal as:
I.

Under the “Totality of the Circumstances” standard, Did the
District Court Err When It Ruled That The Warrantless and
Nonconsensual Blood Draw Was Justified under the
Exigency Exception to the Warrant Requirement?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (capitalization original).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Townsend failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by
affirming the magistrate’s ruling that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless blood draw?

2.

If the blood draw was not justified by exigent circumstances, must this
Court remand to the magistrate for factual findings and application of
currently existing law regarding the implied consent exception?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Townsend Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred By Affirming
The Magistrate’s Ruling That Exigent Circumstances Justified The Warrantless
Blood Draw
A.

Introduction
The magistrate held that the warrantless blood draw was justified by

exigent circumstances. (R. pp. 56-60.) The district court affirmed. (R., pp. 14851.) Townsend contends the lower courts erred because the DUI investigation in
this case was “routine.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-12.) Townsend’s request for a
bright-line test is contrary to the very authority he relies upon. Application of the
“totality of the circumstances” test, as required by applicable law and done by the
lower courts, shows that the warrantless blood draw was justified by the
exigencies confronted by Detective Weires.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. Colvin,
157 Idaho 881, 882, 341 P.3d 598, 599 (Ct. App. 2014). On review of a decision
rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate capacity, the reviewing
court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.” State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho
709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate
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record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to
support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s
conclusions of law follow from those findings.” Id.
C.

Exigent Circumstances Justified The Warrantless Blood Draw
“[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his

person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law
enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978).
Such exigencies include the “imminent risk of destruction of evidence.” State v.
Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 499, 163 P.3d 1208, 1211 (Ct. App. 2007).

“To

determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified
acting without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of circumstances.”
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013). In Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 768-69 (1966), the Supreme Court of the United States found the
following totality of the circumstances to justify a warrantless blood draw because
of exigent circumstances:
Here, there was plainly probable cause for the officer to arrest
petitioner and charge him with driving an automobile while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. The police officer who arrived at
the scene shortly after the accident smelled liquor on petitioner’s
breath, and testified that petitioner’s eyes were ‘bloodshot, watery,
sort of a glassy appearance.’ The officer saw petitioner again at the
hospital, within two hours of the accident. There he noticed similar
symptoms of drunkenness. He thereupon informed petitioner ‘that
he was under arrest and that he was entitled to the services of an
attorney, and that he could remain silent, and that anything that he
told me would be used against him in evidence.’
(Footnote omitted.)
5

The magistrate applied the totality of the circumstances test. (R., pp. 5657. Among the circumstances considered was that it would have taken, “at the
very minimum, one and one half hours” to get a search warrant. (R., p. 59.) The
magistrate further considered that extrapolation of test results backward to the
time of driving would not be available; that a test showing less than .08 would
result in a legal bar to prosecution; the unavailability of other testing methods;
and the possibility that a potential prosecution for an excessive BAC would be
lost. (R., pp. 58-59.) The district court in turn concluded that the totality of the
circumstances created an exigency that justified not seeking a search warrant.
(R., pp. 148-51.) Because the lower courts applied the correct legal standard to
the totality of the circumstances shown by the trial court’s factual findings, they
correctly held that the blood draw was constitutionally reasonable.
On appeal Townsend argues that this case is “identical” to Missouri v.
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), “in that it was a routine DUI investigation.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)

There are two important distinctions Townsend

overlooks. First, in McNeely the state argued that metabolism of blood alcohol
“creates an exigent circumstance in every case” and “did not separately contend
that the warrantless blood test was reasonable regardless of whether the natural
dissipation of alcohol in a suspect’s blood categorically justifies dispensing with
the warrant requirement.” 133 S. Ct. at 1567-68. The Court therefore did not
reach the question of whether exigent circumstances were present in that case
because “the arguments and the record do not provide the Court with an
adequate analytic framework for a detailed discussion of all the relevant factors
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that can be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of acting
without a warrant.” Id. at 1568. Because the Supreme Court never analyzed
whether the facts in McNeely constituted exigent circumstances under the totality
test, its opinion offers no guidance in this case.
An opinion that does offer guidance, however, is Schmerber, 384 U.S.
757. As set forth above, the totality of circumstances in that case was probable
cause to arrest for DUI; a blood draw within two hours of the accident that
garnered police attention; metabolism of the blood in his system; and an
investigation of the DUI and the accident. Id. at 768-69. See also McNeely, 133
S. Ct. at 1559-60 (discussing Schmerber). Although Schmerber was transported
to the hospital for medical reasons, the time-frames at issue for conducting an
investigation and then obtaining a search warrant in that case and this one are
very similar. In Schmerber the investigation alone took almost two hours, which
justified application of the exigency exception regardless of the time it might have
taken to obtain a warrant. In this case the investigation was shorter, but adding
in the time to obtain a warrant would have taken the total time well beyond the
two hours deemed sufficient in Schmerber.
Second, and more importantly, the Supreme Court’s analysis specifically
rejects Townsend’s argument (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-12) that exigent
circumstances cannot exist in a “routine” DUI investigation.

The Court

specifically stated:
Although the Missouri Supreme Court referred to this case as
“unquestionably a routine DWI case,” the fact that a particular
drunk-driving stop is “routine” in the sense that it does not involve
“‘special facts,’” such as the need for the police to attend to a car
7

accident, does not mean a warrant is required. Other factors
present in an ordinary traffic stop, such as the procedures in place
for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a magistrate judge, may
affect whether the police can obtain a warrant in an expeditious
way and therefore may establish an exigency that permits a
warrantless search. The relevant factors in determining whether a
warrantless search is reasonable, including the practical problems
of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still preserves the
opportunity to obtain reliable evidence, will no doubt vary
depending upon the circumstances in the case.
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568 (emphasis added).
Townsend advocates for application of a “special facts” test that would
make the exigency exception inapplicable in “routine” DUI cases. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 8-10.) Although this was the standard applied by the Missouri court, it
was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568.
Because Townsend’s claim of error is based on a legal standard squarely
rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States, he has failed to show error
by the magistrate or district court.
II.
If The Blood Draw Was Not Justified By Exigent Circumstances, This Court
Should Remand To The Magistrate For Factual Findings And Application Of
Currently Existing Law Regarding The Implied Consent Exception
In 2014 this Court reversed prior precedent and held that implied consent
is constitutionally revocable. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 423, 337 P.3d 575,
582 (2014); State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014);
State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, 774, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014). Because the
magistrate did not have the benefit of these decisions, and was deciding the case
on the basis of existing law holding that implied consent was not revocable, he
ultimately did not decide the factual question of whether Townsend revoked his
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implied consent. He did find that Townsend was not blowing adequately for the
breath test, and then “stated that he was not going to comply with the test and
that Weires would have to take his blood.” (R., p. 52.1) This finding could be
interpreted as Townsend withdrawing all consent, but is also consistent with
refusing a breath test and instead insisting on a blood test. Because the district
court did not factually find whether Townsend had revoked his implied consent, if
the lower courts are not affirmed on the exigency analysis remand for further
factual findings is appropriate.

The magistrate also noted Townsend’s testimony in this regard, but did not
make any findings or credibility determinations:
1

Townsend testified that he objected to the blood draw procedure
and protested that the procedure violated his constitutional rights.
These objections were not voiced to Weires, but could have been
made to someone else at the Ada County Jail. Townsend further
testified that jail staff told him that if he did not cooperate they
would hold him down and take his blood. Townsend admitted that
no one ever held him down. He stated that he never gave anyone
permission to take his blood and that he did not physically resist the
blood drawing.
(R., p. 52.) When asked whether Townsend “ever state[d] any objection to you
or to anyone else there, any objection that he had to the blood draw” Detective
Weires testified, “No, sir.” (Tr., p. 13, L. 25 – p. 14, L. 3.)
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Townsend’s conviction
for DUI, second offense.
DATED this 14th day of March, 2016.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of March, 2016, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
ELIZABETH H. ESTESS
DEPUTY ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
200 W. FRONT ST., STE. 1107
BOISE, ID 83702

KKJ/dd

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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